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Private Markets and
Social Control
LLOYD D. ORR
Historically, the basic rationale for the competitive private market system has
stated that if individuals are free to pursue their own economic interests, a system
of organized cooperation will emerge that serves important personal and social needs.
In particular, it has been claimed that the system will be effective in providing:
1) improved material welfare; 2) individual economic and political freedom;
and 3) a broad social justice that rewards the individual's effort in accordance with
society's evaluation of the services he has provided.
It is perhaps surprising that such a system would come into being, and
amazing that it works so well; however, it falls substantially short of reaching
technical, moral, or other value forms of perfection. In fact, the claim of social
benefits flowing from our own economic system is coming under increasingly broad
and severe attack. Critics easily identify serious perversions of the goals which
private enterprise is supposed to serve: 1) the encouragemnt of an individualistic
mass market-oriented hedonism at the expense of social needs; 2) the obvious
problems of discriminatory restriction and alienation of many human beings, often
through other social and political institutions that the economic system allegedly
dominates, and 3) a failure of the merit-reward system as an effective or moral basis
for income distribution, particularly as it applies to upper and lower income strata.
The continuing failure of society to deal adequately with its problems has led to
criticism that goes beyond the imperfections of a fundamentally sound social
organization. Individual economic incentive and private markets, the basics of our
economic organization, are condemned as inherently destructive of desirable social
goals. It may be that such criticism is naive with respect to the basic history of
economic organization and the prospects for meaningful alternatives. It also may be
that the "solutions" offered are frequently more authoritarian than the critics
allege the present system to be. We are still left to ponder the vital, long-standing,
but changeable deficiencies and injustices that our system either tolerates or
actively perpetuates.
A growth in the "corporate state" has been frequently attacked as causing a
distortion of market functions through resource direction by gigantic corporate and
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government bureaucracies. These institutions are alleged to either serve the interests
of the rich and powerful, or become ends in themselves. They tend to shape human
needs rather than serve them, and respond sluggishly and ineffectively to changes
in social goals.
Although such descriptions may be gross caricatures of our economic and
political system, they do represent fundamental problems in social organization.
My purpose is to translate the caricature into a more meaningful analysis-an
analysis in terms of important differences between conditions found in our modern
corporate economy and conditions presumed to hold in theoretical demonstrations
of the attainment of social goals through a system of competitive private markets.
I will concentrate on three conditions that are assumed in the theoretical model
of a competitive market system, but are seriously violated in our modern industrial
economy. Although these conditions are illustrative and their violation can scarcely
explain all of society's ills, they seem to be basic and closely related to a wide
range of fundamental social problems. These conditions are:
1. Large private centers of power do not exist. No individual or cohesive
group is able to avoid or seriously temper the discipline of the market
on a continual or long-term basis.
2. All relatively scarce goods are traded in markets. Generally, economic
costs must be borne by those who benefit from the use of society's
resources.
3. Buyers and sellers have full knowledge of the good being traded.
This provides a precise and known delineation of the good in relation
to all other goods in the market.
We will examine some of the consequences associated with the violation of these
conditions, provide a few illustrations, and suggest some directions for social policy.
Neither the problems discussed nor the suggested solutions are novel. The discussion
concentrates on the relation of problems and policies to fundamental conditions
for a competitive market system.
The perspective followed is the view of private enterprise as a tool or an
instrument-not an end or a goal. It remains a singularly powerful tool for allocating
society's resources among alternative uses. It still compares favorably with known
alternatives in providing a diversity of opportunity that protects individual
economic and political freedom.2
However, the circumstances where natural market constraints do not adequately
channel the system toward community goals tend to increase with the size and
complexity of the economy. Traditional approaches to regulation that may have
worked tolerably well in a simpler era are now seriously questioned as their failures
and negative side effects become increasingly obvious. New directions for social
policy are now being suggested which are likely to be particularly efficient because
of their decreased dependence on government bureaucracy and their substantial
reliance on decentralized and distortion-free incentives. In contrast with many current
policies they tend to complement and strengthen the long-run viability of private
markets as an effective social tool.
CONDITION 1: NO PRIVATE PowER CENTERS
The absence of private centers of concentrated economic power is presumed in a
competitive market system. In our giant corporations and conglomerate enterprises,
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however, there is a serious and increasing failure to meet this condition. The
picture of corporate power presented depends on the statistical measure used.
In manufacturing, the most heavily concentrated area, aggregate concentration has
increased markedly. A larger proportion of total manufacturing assets were held
by the top 100 corporations in 1968 (49.3%) than were held by the top 200 in
1947 (47.2%).' In terms of concentration within particular industries, little change
has occurred in the last twenty years. The average of sales percentages controlled
by the largest three or four firms in each industry has been stable, indicating
substantial growth in absolute size.
Questions may be raised about the adequacy of these statistics as measures of
private power, but the important point is that, in an era of substantial economic
growth, little has been done with the opportunity to reduce concentration via
constraints on corporate size. The formidable level of concentration is now recognized
by a growing segment of the population, which has a basic understanding of the
subtle as well as blatant abuse inherent in large power aggregations. Discord is the
result, and the market system is condemned for many shortcomings that are
properly the result of the presence of private power centers. The absence of such
centers was always presumed as necessary for the system's effectiveness as a
social institution.
In many industries, substantial size is obviously necessary and beneficial.
Large-scale operations may be required for low unit cost, and a critical mass may be
needed to provide resources for research and development. But the giant corporations
of our society have clearly ballooned to a size and acquired concentrated economic
power far beyond the point where these requirements are met.
In the automobile industry, minimum per unit production cost is achieved at
about 600,000 units per year, and approached at a considerably smaller figure.
This is less than half the production rate of Chrysler and less than 15% of General
Motor's annual output. There are certainly advantages to corporate growth beyond
this minimum cost level, but these advantages increasingly benefit the corporation
in terms of its ability to protect and enhance the power it has already acquired.
Society gains little and, indeed, may lose substantially from the limited diversity
within the industry.
In recent years, several economic studies have virtually destroyed the notion
popularized by Madison Avenue that giant corporations are particularly effective
institutions of technological progress and innovation.4 Giant firms do not contribute
disproportionately to technological progress, and are often found in the position
of slowing down the rate of progress or diverting innovation when it threatens their
vested interests. There are apparently many factors in dominant market position
and corporate bureaucracy that inhibit the potential of large corporations as engines
of progress. After a careful review of the literature relating innovation to industrial
concentration, Frederic Scherer concludes:
We emerge again with a threshold concept of the most favorable
industrial climate for rapid technological change. A little bit of monopoly
power, in the form of structural concentration, is conducive to invention and
innovation, particularly when advances in the relevant knowledge base
occur slowly. But very high concentration has a favorable effect only in rare
cases, and more often it is apt to retard progress by restricting the number
of independent sources of initiative and by dampening firms' incentive
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to gain market position through accelerated research and development.
Likewise, it is vital that barriers to new entry be kept at modest levels, and
that established industry members be exposed continually to the threat of
entry by technically audacious newcomers.5
Even in the infrequent cases where giantism is associated with rapid technological
progress, it is not clear that the progress is worth the social-political cost or that
alternative means of achieving the progress are unavailable.
The defenders of corporate power usually argue that the discipline imposed by
rivals and customers will achieve the essential results claimed for a more competitive
market system. It is true that varying degrees of market constraint exist, and
in some dimensions they are quite strong. But we should note that, while the
terms rivalry and competition are virtual synonyms in ordinary usage, their meanings
are quite distinct in economics. Competition, as it has been used by the classical
formulators and defenders of the "competitive market system," implies the absence
of rivalry. When the number of sellers and buyers in a market is large, and no
individual or small group has dominant power, then the market imposes its
impersonal discipline on all. Producers and traders tend to react to current and
expected prices and have little consciousness of each other's behavior, goals, or market
shares. For example, the term rival cannot be applied to the individual farmer, or
trader in basic commodities on organized markets.
In sharp contrast to the "ideal" of competition, the relation of the giant
corporation to its suppliers, dealers, customers, and smaller rivals is inherently
unequal. The notion of corporate behemoths without exploitive power in both
market and non-market relations is ludicrous to anyone who takes the view
that business should exist primarily for the benefit of society, rather than the
reverse.' Valid documentation of abuse seems to be limited only by the amount of
resources devoted to investigation.7
A disturbing long-run problem is the tendency of large centers of power to be
associated with and foster the development of opposing centers of power-strong
labor unions, pyramiding government bureaucracies, and militant dealer and
consumer organizations. As a result, decisions tend to be made through adversary
power blocs that are large relative to the individual consumer, voter, laborer, and
businessman. Some of the difficulties stemming from the relationships of these large
power blocs have become particularly obvious in connection with the political
scandals of recent years.
Few things are more unpopular with the business community than social policies
that limit or reduce large concentrations of corporate power. One gets the impression
from positions taken by corporate leaders that they would accept a large degree of
government regulation (however reluctantly) rather than face dissolution. Perhaps
this primacy of loyalty to a particular enterprise is appropriate, but it should not
be confused with dedication to the survival of a competitive market system as
the backbone of our economic organization. When there is a choice between reducing
private power and regulating it, the requirement for a market-oriented economy is
clear-reduce the power. Balance the power of business, labor, and consumers
at a relatively modest level. In the other direction lies an increasing degree of
economic resource administration through a combination of private and
government powers.
Although our anti-trust laws have been credited with preventing the degree of
collusion and cartelization that is observed in Europe, they have clearly been
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ineffective in preventing less blatant forms of combination through financial control
and trade associations, or the growth of power within individual corporate firms.
An alternative policy for reducing large aggregates of corporate and financial power
is the use of a progressive value-added tax as a replacement for the corporate
income tax.
Value-added--essentially the payments to labor and capital made by a firm
over a period of time-is one of the best available measures of firm size in terms of
current operations . A value-added tax that becomes progressive after a certain
level is reached will penalize the large firm in comparison with its smaller rivals.
If economies of scale or other efficiencies are sufficiently large to offset the tax rate,
then a firm will tend to retain its assets and pay a tax bill that represents the
judgment of society as to the disadvantages of large size. Otherwise, the firm will
seek some method of divestiture in order to reduce the competitive penalty that
the tax imposes.
The advantage of the tax is that it substitutes for a cumbersome and ineffective
judicial process a system that could provide a powerful incentive to reduce excess
firm size. It also allows the business community to make the crucial decisions
as to the most appropriate division or divestiture, as opposed to the more arbitrary
decisions of a court.
Many problems as to appropriate rates and exemptions would have to be
resolved before the political battle to implement such a policy could begin. The most
frequently voiced objection is that growth is the reward for efficiency and a
progressive tax would destroy important incentives. But, unlimited growth in firm
size is obviously not the only way in which rewards for efficiency can be realized.
A progressive value-added tax would encourage realization of reward through
profitable spinoff of successful divisions or subsidiaries.8 The firm would usually
prefer the security of size and diversity, but given the social desirability of limiting
firm size the progressive value-added tax has much to recommend it when compared
to judicial procedure.
CONDITION 2: ALL GOODS TRADED IN MARKETS
A second condition of the competitive market system that is violated with
increasingly serious consequences is the requirement that all goods be traded in
markets. The effects of this failure are revealed in "spillover" effects, which relate to
persons not directly involved in market transactions. Although one of the best
current examples of a spillover effect is the pollution problem, the concept is relevant
to a wide variety of social problems ranging from defense policy to income distribution.
Society has responded to the economic and political consequences of spillover
effects in many areas. For example, the state heavily subsidizes education, in
part because society derives enormous benefits above and beyond the benefit to the
individual educated. These benefits are "goods" that would not pass through the
market if education were left strictly to free enterprise. Individuals would consider
only private benefits when deciding how much education to buy. Society as a whole
would achieve substantially less than the desirable amount of education. Since the
free market is not able to establish a value for society's gains, the case is made
for some sort of subsidy to pay for society's benefits and encourage a larger output
from the "education industry."
Pollution is, of course, a negative spillover. When levels of population and
industrial density are relatively low, air and water resources may absorb society's
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effluent fairly easily. In fact, air and water were used for years in economics as
classic examples of "free goods"-goods that were valuable to society, but were in
such abundance that no charge was necessary to allocate their use. No more!
We have clearly exceeded the assimilative capacity of these resources in many areas
in large part because we have treated them as free goods. They are now properly
called "common property resources" of the community. Use of these resources
cannot be subjected to a competitive market because of their ubiquitous nature;
thus, use of the resource by one clearly has negative effects on others for which there
is no convenient compensation mechanism.
The business community has absorbed a considerable amount of inappropriate
criticism on the pollution issue. Business has used the common property resources
within an established social framework on the same basis as everyone else. Costs and
prices for privately produced goods were generally lower than they otherwise would
have been, but at the expense of environmental deterioration. The charge of high
profits from polluting the environment can only stem from a failure to understand
how a market system works. Excess profits from the free use of society's resources
would tend to be eliminated by an expansion of output and lower prices within
the affected industries.
Nevertheless, the day of reckoning has come. The social framework must
change, common property resources must be husbanded, and business is in for
painful adjustment just like everyone else. The question is how to change the social
framework. There is a growing interest in systems of charges (in the form of
special taxes) according to use of air and waterways that are based on economic
theory and empirical study.'
There are two primary advantages to this system. First, the price of a product
will better reflect its true resource cost since charges for effluents will be included.
This provides for a more effective allocation of resources and also tends to
discourage the use of goods with high pollution characteristics relative to other
goods. Second, the system would mandate the business community to do what
it does best-respond to an incentive. Present a manufacturing firm with a per
unit cost and it will immedately seek ways to reduce it; the response will include
both the effective use of current technology and a search for new technology. We
can anticipate generally reduced effluent and imaginative recycling under this type
of program.
Even under an inevitably imperfect system of charges the business community
could provide a flexibility in adaptation and an intensity of innovation that could
not be matched under the guidance of a regulatory agency. Once a charge system
is imposed, the incentive of the firm is switched from hiring lawyers to represent
its case before the regulatory agency to hiring engineers in order to minimize the
pollution cost of output. The firm must now treat environmental resources in the
same way it treats capital and labor resources: that is it must continually try to
reduce the environmental content of a unit of output. The long run impact is
that a given degree of environmental control could be achieved at a smaller
cost to the business community, and thus to society, than would be possible under
current programs.
Conservation and ecological groups were initially opposed to the concept of
charges for effluents since it seems to emphasize use of the environment rather
than its preservation. It appeared that the state would be recklessly selling its
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common property resources, and that pollution taxes would become essentially the
price for a license to pollute. These views are rapidly changing as the effectiveness
and outstanding potential of quasi price-system charges are demonstrated.10
There are many problems associated with establishing an appropriate set
of "pollution prices" and overcoming transitional difficulties, but the great promise
of this technique is that it constrains business practices by making use of business
incentive. It is a piece of the social framework that is both potentially effective
and unusually compatible with the free enterprise system.
Business opposition to effluent taxes seems to stem from the immediate
impact on cost, and a realization that these charges would not be subject to the
delays and manipulation that the administered standards approach has permitted."
There is also the all too often demonstrated potential for "capture" of the agency
by those it is supposed to regulate. In its preference for a bureaucratic over a
price-system oriented approach, the business community has provided an excellent
example of the conflict between their own short-run interests and the long-run
interests of a viable market-oriented economy.
Other examples of policies that make heavy use of individual incentives as
effective means for meeting spillover effects can be cited. It has been suggested
that giving students vouchers that are spendable at private institutions would result
in a more efficient, equitable, and diversified education system that we have with
public schools. The market test would encourage efficiency; the statewide or
nationwide means of financing the voucher system would provide a more equitable
floor than the current property tax base for school financing; and a wider spectrum
of institutions would develop to handle the diversity of educational needs that has
long been recognized.
Poverty can be related to spillover effects in many important ways. On the
one hand, the reduction of poverty would reduce such negative spillovers as crime
and social dissension that are associated with low income. On the other hand,
poverty itself is importantly the result of negative spillovers that are visited on
certain groups by the rest of society. Various forms of discrimination provide
an obvious example of the influence of spillovers on income distribution. Less
obvious is the disproportionate impact of technological change on incomes in the
lower strata. The relatively well off and well educated adapt to technological
change fairly readily. But the skills of the poor tend to be narrowly circumscribed,
and technological obsolescence of these meager skills tends to drop them to the
bottom rung of the income ladder. A phenomenon that has important positive effects
for society as a whole visits disproportionate negative efforts on low income groups.
An important conclusion is that the case for income redistribution does not
have to rest entirely on ethical grounds. A strong case can be made on technical
and economic grounds in connection with certain spillover effects.
The negative income tax, or family allowance, has been widely discussed as
an efficient means for the reduction of poverty.12 The details cannot be dealt with
here, but essentially the plan starts every family with a basic income floor and
then taxes away the subsidy as earned income rises. The basic advantages lie
in its simplicity; in the generation of positive family and work incentives when
compared to current welfare programs; and in the basic compatibility with other
programs such as job retraining and day care.
The negative income tax has only one test for poverty-low income. The
distribution of funds becomes relatively efficient and the proportion of tax dollars
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going to the recipient, as opposed to the welfare bureaucracy, increases. Since
the subsidy is only gradually taxed away there is always an advantage to the
recipient of increasing his earned income. There is no precipitous cut-off point.
There are no man-in-the-house rules or other regulations that provide adverse
incentives and burdensome enforcement problems.
None of the above suggestions for new policy approaches is utopian. They all
have problems of implementation and operation, and disadvantages as well as
advantages when compared to current policies. What I want to emphasize is that
the general public and professional alike need to realize the need to handle the
growing spillover problems of a complex society more effectively than we have in
the past. An important tool that is available to us is the incentives that already
exist in the private system. If we can effectively use them we not only enhance the
achievement of our social goals, but we also minimize the inefficiencies that public
often imposes on the private sector.
CONDITION 3: FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PRODUCT
A third condition required for effective operation of a competitive market
system is that buyers and sellers have full knowledge of the product or service
being traded. As products become more varied and sophisticated, failure to fulfill
this condition becomes more obvious, particularly in markets for consumer goods.
To the extent that consumer knowledge is inadequate, there is a tendency for the
enterprise to serve consumer interest less and its own interest more.
As a means of communicating objective product knowledge, advertising,
particularly in the national media, is of limited value and subject to much justifiable
criticism. It may often be viewed as an attempt to instill the idea that detailed
product knowledge is unnecessary or even to convey misinformation.' The FTC
"watchdog", the need to uphold a "brand name reputation", and businessmen's
alleged respect for "sharp-eyed housewives" do not seem to have substantially
affected the nature of mass advertising. Business gain via product misinformation
may not always be a successful strategy, but it is easy to cite examples where
it is used profitably on either a temporary or a sustained basis by the most
respectable business enterprises.
The apparent profitability of consumer ignorance is further suggested by
the uniformly vigorous opposition of the business community to virtually all
information disclosure laws. An excellent example was its distress over the Truth
in Lending Act, which in essence required only that a customer understand the
simple rate of interest that he is asked to pay on the unpaid balance of his debt.
If the business community is concerned about its loss of credibility to the public,
it would do well to ponder its image as it opposes a modest educative attempt to
enable the poor and the ignorant (those most affected by usurious time purchase
contracts) to protect themselves from excessive expenditures when they purchase
durable goods.
Consumer education should have a high priority among society's goals. In
teaching citizens to care for themselves, we reduce the necessity for someone
else to care for them. Product information disclosure, including such items as
grade labeling and unit pricing, is also important. The education approach to
consumer protection involves not only knowledge, but an effective and convenient
means for translating the knowledge into meaningful product and price comparisons
in a complex market environment.
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Finally, legal responsibility on the part of business for products and advertising
may become an important tool for the consumer. It tends to spread the benefits of
expertise on the part of a few to the mass of consumers.
There are and will continue to be problems of establishing appropriate
guidelines in all these areas of consumer protection. Regulation of advertising has
a long history of failure, whether imposed within the industry or by the Federal
government. Information disclosure, consumer education, and legal responsibility
for products and advertising are likely to be more effective. With these forms of
control the degree of centralized regulation and monitoring of economic decisions is
relatively small. Also, there is a substantial involvement of individual producer
and consumer incentive that will enhance the chances for long run success in this
difficult area of social policy.
MARKET ORIENTED SOCIAL POLICY
The question of an appropriate social framework for meeting community
goals is a vital one. In relation to the free enterprise system it is important as a
determinant of the extent to which the business enterprise serves society's needs in its
pursuit of profit. The claim that the enterprise system automatically serves the best
interests of its customers and society and, therefore, should be left free of constraints
other than those inherent in the market place (laissez faire) cannot be taken
seriously.
It is equally true that, in adding nonmarket constraints to the social framework,
we can do worse than laissez faire. Policies must be carefully considered in terms
of their interface with the economic system and with other elements of the social
framework. The negative effects of failure to do this are obvious in many areas
of social policy: e.g., pollution control, urban renewal, family assistance, and various
forms of industry regulation.
My purpose has been to interpret some of the major problems faced by the
modem business system in terms of the system's failure to meet certain conditions
presumed to hold in a competitive market economy. This approach suggests a
search for policies that are surrogates for the constraints that were never adequate
or have failed to survive naturally within the system. A proper surrogate should
be compatible with the enterprise system, insofar as possible, in order to enhance
the system's long-run social-political viability and preserve the drive for efficiency
that flows from private incentive. The most successful policies are likely to be those
that have a strong element of private incentive in their operation and enforcement.
Sustained concern for our fellow man is, unfortunately, a commodity that is in
short supply. We should not squander it in areas where more sustainable-if less
laudable-motivations will achieve the same or superior results.
It is my belief in society's ability to erect a framework that uses individual
incentive to meet society's goals that leads me to take a dim view of "corporate
responsibility" and "public members" on boards of directors. This is not a question
of the corporate leader's morality; the view is based on concern for an effective
organization of society's institutions. It is the appropriate role of businessmen
(as well as workmen and consumers) to pursue their economic goals in the market
place. It is the citizen's responsibility through the political process to establish a
social framework that makes this pursuit compatible with community goals. To shift
social responsibility to the business community is to both reduce the effectiveness
of the enterprise and ensure a selective and haphazard pursuit of community
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goals. Also, the additional status conferred on corporations as quasi-political
organizations has implications that are disturbing to anyone who values a
pluralistic society. If we expect businessmen to behave like statesmen, we will
ultimately be faced with their claim to the powers of statesmen!
A serious counterargument to the view that society should depend heavily
on self-interest in its economic organization claims that such emphasis interferes
with the development of desirable social motivations and the achievement
of society's highest aspirations. The issue is an important one and needs wider
recognition and discussion than it receives.
Unquestionably, the efficiency that stems from individual economic incentive
is of value when viewed in isolation. Nearly all of society's goals require the
use of economic resources for their achievement. Unless one of our goals is make-work
(perhaps on the grounds that work builds moral character but output destroys it),
efficiency will simply enable us to achieve more of our goals with given resources
and technology. Even if our primary goal is more leisure, the vital role of efficiency
should be obvious. The negative aspect is, of course, that individual incentive-
or, more broadly, the private enterprise system-inevitably influences society's
goals. It may do so in ways that are judged to be undesirable and thereby diminish
its own value as a social instrument.
Many abuses and questionable goals are directly or indirectly related to the
failure of market conditions and inadequate policy concepts emphasized in this
paper: the self-serving and manipulative tendencies of market power; the failure
to give proper consideration to a wide variety of spillover effects (e.g., in pollution,
health, and income redistribution); and the exploitation of consumer myopia and
ignorance. The basic problem remains: can we build a social framework that is
compatible with both a system of markets and the achievement of our social
aspirations? The radical contention is that we cannot-social goals will continue
to be lost in a structure that generates the power mechanism and the will to
concentrate our efforts on the creation and satisfaction of a narrow spectrum of
private wants.
The suggestion that strengthening effective market mechanisms and reducing
market power are central to preserving the viability of free enterprise is usually labeled
as naive in the context of the twentieth century industrial world. It does seem
out-of-touch with trends. But what are the alternatives? The world of private and
public socialism that Galbraith suggests is already upon us." A more traditional
form of central planning? Marcuse's world of "repressive tolerance"?" I find
these a dismal choice of oligarchies.
The broad-based and serious questioning of our institutions is likely to
continue as levels of public education and awareness are increased. The promise
of a good society, based on a Calvinist morality or National Association of
Manufacturer's rationalization in relation to our present set of institutions,
will wither under the intense questioning of existing and coming generations.
The question is can we, or should we, save the concept of free markets from the
drift of twentieth century capitalism and the reactions to capitalism's excesses?
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